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ABSTRACT 
 
To conclude the above discussion it needs to be stressed that it is extremely 
important to try to find the borders between public law and private law. These 
borders should be searched for by way of improving the existing type models. 
The practical example of using the typology method in the Polish legal doctrine 
is the assessment of the character of property dispossession claim. 
The presented example clearly indicates the degree to which social sciences 
are interconnected. The change in social attitudes indirectly affects the general 
philosophy, which in turn reflects in legal philosophy. The change of a paradigm 
in legal philosophy, for example a switch from legal natural paradigm to positiv-
ist paradigm steadily reveals itself in the paradigm of dogmatic sciences, e.g. in 
the used methods of interpretation (and their respective value) and the division 
of more detailed sciences. Social sciences paradigms influence one another and 
are closely interconnected. 
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OVERVIEW 
 
A legal system, when analysed from a horizontal perspective, can be divided 
into specific sections, or so-called ‘branches.’
1
 Each of these branches has its 
own characteristics, which can be understood as a separate set of general rules 
which protect separate categories of goods and legal values. A branch of law 
“encompasses several sets of legal norms, which are coherent and classified on 
the basis of defined criteria and which regulate extensive categories of social 
relations. In other words, it is assumed that a branch of law regulates social rela-
tions with which it fully corresponds. As a result, the legal norms included in a 
given branch of law directly apply to a corresponding legal relation.”
2
 
Throughout the ages, the problems concerning the distinction between vari-
ous branches of law appeared along with the experience of applying the law. 
Moreover, there is a question of distinguishing between the entire systems – the 
private law system and the civil law system. 
 
THE INTENDMENT OF DISTINGUISHING PRIVATE LAW FROM PUBLIC 
LAW AND ITS IMPACT ON THE METHODOLOGY OF DOGMATIC LE-
GAL THEORIES 
 
As already mentioned in the introduction of this paper, there are significant dif-
ficulties in the process of determining to which branch of the law a given regula-
tion and its derivatives (e.g. legal relations, rights, obligations) really belongs. 
Sometimes meaning of a norm differs depending on into which branch of law 
we include a specific set of legal regulations. Particularly, such situation occurs if: 
 legal regulations do not regulate legal institutions fully; 
 a legal institution is considered to be the so-called borderline institution be-
tween public law and private law. 
If the abovementioned situation occurs, the law should be interpreted on the 
basis of the general principles of a given law section, or the legal inference rules 
should be applied, e.g. analogical reasoning. The results of our analysis can 
vary, depending on the law section the regulations of which we decided to refer 
to in our reasoning. The example of problematic institutions is indemnification 
of damages caused through lawful actions of public authorities. In such situa-
tions, applying the criteria of distinction between public law and private law 
becomes indispensable. 
 
 
                                                 
1 L. Morawski, Wstęp do prawoznawstwa, Toruń 2004, p. 73. 
2 Z. Radwański, Prawo cywilne – część ogólna, Warszawa 2005, p. 5. 
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THE PARADIGMS FOR DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN PRIVATE LAW 
AND PUBLIC LAW 
 
Throughout the ages, legal scholars have been interested in the duality of public 
and private law. Some of the representatives of the doctrine perceive this divi-
sion as the pillar of the legal order or a starting point for legal systematics. An-
other group of scholars considers the division an example of the destructive 
interference of politics in legal doctrine.
3
 
In the theory of law, the following paradigms have been distinguished: 
 the paradigm which enables us to assign separate legal institutions to public 
law or private law through classification method; 
 the paradigm which denies the need to make a distinction between public law 
and private law; 
 the paradigm which enables us to assign separate legal institutions to public 
law or private law through typology method. 
 
re. a) Classification as the method of distinguishing between private law and 
public law 
 
Classification is a multilevel logical division which guarantees exhaustive and 
disjoint division. In order to perform classification, it is required to adopt a crite-
rion, which would clearly determine the public or private law nature of legal 
regulations. 
Protecting natural rights of individuals in relation to the whole society and 
the state was the underlying concept of the modern natural law philosophy. 
Therefore, the thinkers of the Enlightenment era opted for a strict division be-
tween the sphere of rights inherent to individuals and those inherent to wider 
community.
4
 As a result, Ulpian’s formula Publicum ius est quo ad statum rei 
Romanae spectat privatim quo ad singulorium utilitatem was reborn and popu-
larized. This formula recognized the legal norms related to state interest as pub-
lic law, whereas the norms related to the interests of individuals were considered 
as private law.
5
 
The systematics of the Prussian Landrecht serves as a good example of a 
strict division between private law and public law. Landrecht was divided into 
two parts: the one concerning individual rights and the other on social rights.
6
 
This division was being justified by the thesis promoted by natural law philoso-
                                                 
3 Ibidem, p. 2. 
4 K. Sójka-Zielińska, Historia prawa, Warszawa 2006, p. 230. 
5 The period before the 19th century can be considered a pre-theory phase. 
6 K. Sójka-Zielińska, op. cit., p. 231. 
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phers, who stated that a human being simultaneously serves two roles in the 
world: he exists as an individual, as well as a member of society.
7
 
The scholars who referred to this paradigm in their activities were convinced 
that dichotomous (disjunctive) division between public and private law is possi-
ble and valuable. However, these scholars applied different criteria of division. 
In theory, there were several different criteria of distinguishing between public 
law and private law proposed by the scholars, for example: 
 the subject criterion – it is based on the assumption that private law regulates 
relations between private entities, whereas public law regulates relations be-
tween entities, among which at least one is a public authority;
8
 
 the subject of regulations – this criterion was a part of the so-called ‘revenue 
office theory,’ which stated that the property subject of regulations is a crite-
rion which distinguishes both legal systems;
9
 
 the criterion of claims vindication – regulatory claims are vindicated accord-
ing to official routine, whereas claims related to private law are vindicated 
upon application of the interested parties;
10
 
 the criterion of the method of regulating social relations – this criterion is an 
element of the theory of subordination, also called submission theory. Sub-
ordination of one entity of the legal relation to the other one serves as the di-
vision criterion. It is worth stressing that the abovementioned criterion was 
criticized by E. Iserzon, who claimed that: “The administered party is not le-
gally subordinated to the administrating party, but they are both restricted by 
law;”
11
 
 the criterion of administrative-legal relation – according to E. Iserzon: “The 
criterion of administrative-legal relation consists in obeying nemo iudex 
idoneus in causa propria rule in civil law relationships and not obeying it in 
administrative law relationships;”
12
 
 the criterion of sovereignty – it refers to the variant of the theory of subordi-
nation, namely the theory of subordination concerning sovereignty criterion. 
The characteristic feature of public law is the fact that one of the entities par-
ticipating in the legal relation is the authority which exercises state sover-
eignty – that is the right to one-sidedly determine the legal situation of an ex-
ternal entity. In this case, the difference between both types of legal relations 
consists in “a different trial status of the parties in case the need to authorita-
tively determine the legal relation between the parties occurs.”
13
 
                                                 
7 Ibidem. 
8 J. Zimmerman, Prawo administracyjne, Warszawa 2012, p. 37. 
9 Ibidem. 
10 L. Morawski, op. cit., p. 92. 
11 E. Iserzon, Uwagi o kryterium stosunku administracyjno-prawnego (próba rewizji), 
„Państwo i Prawo” 1965, No. 11, p. 666. 
12 Ibidem, p. 668. 
13 Ibidem, p. 666. 
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The methodology of distinguishing between private law and public law pre-
sented above was applied nearly until the end of the 20
th
 century. However, the 
described paradigm was abandoned, because it proved ineffective. Very often, 
the developed distinction criteria could not have been used to clearly classify 
specific legal institutions. Moreover, there were doubts expressed concerning 
the aim and sense of distinguishing between private law and public law. As the 
crisis continued, a new paradigm emerged. 
 
re. b)  The paradigm which denied the need to make a distinction between pri-
vate law and public law 
 
The proponents of legal positivism – including Kelsen – claimed that the distinc-
tion between public law and private law is entirely ideological and should be 
replaced with hierarchical, multilevel structure of positive law. Such structure 
would clearly correspond with the hierarchical structure of state authorities, 
which have different competences regarding law creation.
14
 
The criticism of the dichotomous division of law was also a part of totalitari-
an states ideology. Private law was per se perceived as contradictory to the un-
derlying principles of these systems and was expected to steadily vanish.
15
 
The western legal culture, however, accepted the theory of private law socie-
ty,
16
 where the legal order was a product of decentralized declarations of intent 
made by entities driven by their own interests.
17
 
The scholars propagating the described paradigm denied the necessity to 
maintain the dualism of public law and private law within a single legal order. 
Therefore, searching for any criteria for distinguishing public and private law 
seemed pointless. 
The demise of totalitarian states (e.g. in the countries of the eastern block) 
and the tendency to publicize law in the west, which resulted from the develop-
ment of welfare state functions, led to the crisis of the paradigm described 
above. It was stated that monistic legal system cannot be applied in contempo-
rary states. 
 
re. c)  Typology as the method of distinguishing between private law and public 
law 
 
The weaknesses of the paradigms described in points a) and b) above resulted in 
the creation of a new paradigm, which is becoming increasingly popular and 
respected nowadays. According to this paradigm, the division into public law 
and private law: 
                                                 
14 S. Włodyka, Problem struktury prawa, „Państwo i Prawo” 1995/4, p. 4. 
15 Ibidem, p. 5. 
16 For example the theory created by Hayek, Böhm. 
17 S. Włodyka, op. cit., p. 5. 
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 is very important in pragmatic and systematic terms; 
 is considered approximate, since it is impossible to strictly distinguish these 
two systems of law. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, there is neither    
a single criterion nor a set of criteria which, when applied, would guarantee 
disjunctive division. Secondly, the legal system is a derivative of social rela-
tions, which cannot be subjected to the abovementioned division processes.
18
 
In order to apply the abovementioned assumptions, the method of distin-
guishing types should be used. This method consists in assessing “the degree to 
which the characteristics of the items from a given set are similar to the item 
which characteristics are crucial for us […] One can distinguish typical and less 
typical items by stating how much they differ from the chosen specimen.”
19
 
There are obvious advantages of using such method of division, namely “the 
possibility to highlight the underlying features, which are characteristic for         
a given law type and, on this basis,  indicate the desired law development paths; 
the possibility to distinguish public law and private law method of regulation 
and indicate which elements and methods of regulation are ‘foreign’ in a given 
branch of law, as well as assess if there is a serious justification for this situation 
and how rational it is.”
20
 
While analyzing the specific institutions on the borderline between public 
law and private law, one can notice the characteristic features of both areas of 
law. The area that a given institution should be included in depends on which 
features are prevalent (the so-called ‘type distinction’). 
The type model is a product of a simultaneous application of multiple differ-
ent division criteria. Scholars using the typology method paradigm should speci-
fy this paradigm, in this way creating a better specimen of a given type.
21
 
 
AN EXAMPLE OF A TYPE SPECIMEN 
 
The model relation/private law institution is distinguished by the following fea-
tures: 
 the party of a legal relation is a public authority; 
 claims are vindicated upon request of interested parties; 
 the parties of a legal relation remain equal; 
                                                 
18 See J. Boć, Wyrównywanie strat wynikłych z legalnych działań administracji, Wrocław 
1971, p. 188. The author indicates that the tendency to perceive different branches of law as 
separate systems results from the assumption that social relations which are regulated by these 
branches are also separate and frequent ambiguity while dividing the subjects of regulation is 
only caused by social relations’ variety, intensity and mutual connection. 
19 Z. Ziembiński, Logika praktyczna, Warsaw 2005, p. 61. 
20 S. Włodyka, op. cit., p. 12. 
21 Por. A. Cebera, Charakter prawny odszkodowania za wywłaszczenie nieruchomości, 
„Przegląd Prawa Publicznego” 2013, No. 9, p. 7. 
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 the rule nemo iudex idoneus in causa propria is applied; 
 none of the parties of a legal relation exercises administrative sovereignty. 
 
The model public law institution is distinguished by the following features: 
 one of the parties of a legal relation is a public authority; 
 claims are vindicated according to official procedure; 
 the parties of a legal relation do not remain equal; 
 the rule nemo iudex idoneus in causa propria is not applied; 
 one of the parties of a legal relation exercises administrative sovereignty. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
To conclude the above discussion, it needs to be stressed that it is extremely 
important to try to find the borders between public law and private law. These 
borders should be searched for by way of improving the existing type models. 
The practical example of using the typology method in the Polish legal doctrine 
is the assessment of the character of property dispossession claim. Its results 
were published in the Public Law Overview (“Przegląd Prawa Publicznego”) in 
2013.
22
 
The presented example clearly indicates the degree to which social sciences 
are interconnected. The change in social attitudes indirectly affects the general 
philosophy, which in turn reflects in legal philosophy. The change of a paradigm 
in legal philosophy, for example a switch from legal natural paradigm to positiv-
ist paradigm, steadily reveals itself in the paradigm of dogmatic sciences, e.g. in 
the used methods of interpretation (and their respective value) and the division 
of more detailed sciences. Social sciences paradigms influence one another and 
are closely interconnected. 
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